




Financial liberalization has been one of the key trends characterizing the
post-Bretton Woods era, with decreasing capital controls and an increas-
ing participation of developing countries in international ﬁnancial mar-
kets in recent decades. More broadly, domestic ﬁnancial development,
measured in terms of liquid liabilities or stock market capitalization,
has risen dramatically over the same period. By using Bayesian Model
Averaging (BMA) and General-to-speciﬁc (Gets) approaches, Chapter 2
examines the long-run determinants of ﬁnancial development. However,
what are the factors directly stimulating governments to liberalize the
ﬁnancial sector, aimed at enhancing ﬁnancial development? Building on
the framework of Abiad and Mody (2005) (AM hereafter), this chapter
attempts to answer this question and to provide a more comprehensive
view of the political economy of ﬁnancial reform.
Although ﬁnancial liberalization has been criticized as increasing the
likelihood of ﬁnancial crises and ﬁnancial fragility, it is widely regarded
as promoting the ﬂow of ﬁnancial resources, thereby reducing capital
costs, stimulating investment and fostering ﬁnancial development and
economic growth (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache, 1998; Summers, 2000). In practice, governments in recent
decades have been committed to reducing direct intervention in the
ﬁnancial system by easing or removing controls over interest rates, credit
allocation and ﬁnancial transactions domestically and internationally,
opening up the banking system for foreign entry, and privatizing com-
mercial banks or non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries. What are the main
factors inducing governments to take these steps?
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AM introduce an analytical framework to examine the factors that
induce governments to undertake ﬁnancial reforms. Using an ordered
logit technique to estimate their speciﬁcations, AM argue that policy
change in a country is positively related to its level of liberalization and
any liberalization gap from the regional leader. The pace of reform is
found to be affected by shocks or discrete changes such as a balance-of-
payments crisis, a banking crisis, a new government’s ﬁrst year in ofﬁce,
participation in an IMF programme and a decline in US interest rates.
However, they ﬁnd that ideology and political and economic structures
have “limited inﬂuence” on the likelihood of reform.
The AM analytical framework is attractive in many respects, but some
aspects of their empirical analysis merit further attention. First, the
ordered logit technique they apply may not be appropriate for this
context, although the discrete and ordinal nature of the ﬁnancial liber-
alization level, FLi,t , and policy change, FLi,t , may render the ordered
logit method a natural choice at ﬁrst glance. In the AM analysis, the
dependent variable is not the level of ﬁnancial liberalization, but the change
in the level of liberalization. AM treat a movement from a score of 1 to
3 of the underlying index the same as they do a movement from 16 to
18, among many other possibilities for a speciﬁc change (say +2). How-
ever, the lack of cardinality in the scale of their original measure implies
that movements along the scale for a speciﬁc change are not equiva-
lent. Given this particular nature of the dependent variable, resorting
to the ordered logit technique may not lead to the expected gains.84
Second, as in most cross-country research, AM do not take into account
the effects of common trends and the possibility of error dependence
across countries and over time. The importance of error dependence
seems especially relevant when the effects of domestic learning and
regional diffusion are investigated, and is conﬁrmed by the results of
this analysis, including a formal test of dependence following Pesaran
(2004).
In this analysis, four innovations are introduced. The ﬁrst is that,
rather than their ordered logit technique, this analysis centres on the
Pesaran (2006) common correlated effect pooled (CCEP) approach that
allows for the possibility of error dependence across countries. Second,
to adjust for serial correlation in individual errors, the panel-robust stan-
dard errors after Arellano (1987) are computed for the CCEP estimates.85
Third, it adds the extent of democracy into the AM framework, by intro-
ducing the Polity indicator, “polity2”, in the PolityIV Database (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2008), seeking to measure institutional quality. The level of
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democracy is a potentially important variable which reﬂects the polit-
ical environment in which new policies are approved or rejected, and
policy changes take place. Fourth, in addition to focusing on the orig-
inal dataset used by AM, it takes up a further investigation based on a
larger set of countries, in which the Abiad and Mody ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion index is replaced by the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness
(2006).
This chapter produces the following ﬁndings. In general it conﬁrms the
negative effects of banking crises and high inﬂation on policy change,
as observed by AM. It is also consistent with AM in suggesting that the
effects of new governments in their ﬁrst year and IMF programmes are
strong when ﬁnancial sectors are highly repressed, and become weaker as
the level of ﬁnancial liberalization goes up. However, this chapter points
to the following three distinct conclusions. First, it shows that some
of their ﬁndings on the effects of crises and shocks are fragile. Second,
it is at odds with AM on the effects of domestic learning and regional
diffusion. It suggests that policy change in a country is negatively rather
than positively related to its liberalization level, and the liberalization
gap from the regional leader appears less relevant than in AM. Third, this
analysis observes a signiﬁcant effect of the extent of democracy, the new
variable added to the Abiad and Mody framework, on policy change. The
ﬁndings on the negative effects of domestic learning and irrelevance of
regional diffusion are supported by a larger sample of countries drawing
on the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness.
Section 5.2 provides a brief discussion of the model speciﬁcations and
econometric methods. Section 5.3 presents the empirical results, based
on the original dataset with the AM measure, and a larger set of coun-
tries with the Chinn-Ito measure, separately. Section 5.4 discusses the
implications of the ﬁndings. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Methodology
This section starts by brieﬂy describing the models used in AM to
study how ﬁnancial reform is shaped, followed by a discussion of the
econometric methods that will be applied in this chapter.
5.2.1 Model speciﬁcations
Below is the general model structure that captures the effects of domestic
learning, regional diffusion, discrete changes and ideology and structure
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on policy changes.
FLit = α(FL∗it − FLi,t−1)





The dependent variable, FLit , is used to measure policy change, the
difference between the level of ﬁnancial liberalization in the current
period, FLit , and the past level of ﬁnancial liberalization, FLi,t−1. FL86it
ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 and 1 corresponding to complete ﬁnan-
cial repression and complete ﬁnancial liberalization, respectively. FL∗it
is the desired level of ﬁnancial liberalization. The adjustment factor, α,
measures the degree of status quo bias. A lower value of α is associated
with more resistance to reform and a greater bias towards the status
quo. The ﬁrst term on the RHS is therefore used to examine domes-
tic adjustment. The second term captures regional diffusion in which
REG_FLi,t−1 is the maximum level of ﬁnancial liberalization achieved
in the region. SHOCKSit denotes discrete changes including four types
of crises – balance-of-payments crises (BOPit ), banking crises (BANKit ),
recessions (RECESSIONit ) and high inﬂation periods (HINFLit ) – and three
types of internal or external inﬂuences like the incumbent’s ﬁrst year
in ofﬁce (FIRSTYEARit ), the inﬂuence of international ﬁnancial institu-
tions reﬂected by a dummy for an IMF programme of lending (IMFit )
and the inﬂuence of global factors proxied by the US Treasury Bill rate
(USINTit ). IDEOLOGYit reﬂects political orientation including a dummy
for left-wing government (LEFTit ) and a dummy for right-wing gov-
ernment (RIGHTit ). STRUCTUREit represents structural variables (either
economic or political), for example the trade openness measure (OPENit )
used in AM.
Overall, the Abiad and Mody framework is appealing, covering almost
all possible aspects. However, a political structural variable, the extent
of democracy (POLITY2it ), may be relevant to the analysis and is added
to their framework. This is the Polity indicator “polity2” in the PolityIV
Database (Marshall and Jaggers 2008) and seeks to measure institutional
quality based on the freedomof suffrage, operational constraints on exec-
utives and respect for other basic political rights and civil liberties. It
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is called the “combined polity score”, deﬁned as the democracy score
minus the autocracy score.87
5.2.1.1 Benchmark speciﬁcation
The benchmark speciﬁcation assumes that the desired level of ﬁnancial
liberalization, FL∗it , is the perfect level of ﬁnancial liberalization and
the adjustment factor, α, is positively related to the level of ﬁnancial
liberalization to allow for the likelihood of domestic learning. Putting
FL∗ = 1 and α = θ1FLi,t−1(θ1 > 0) into Equation (5.1) above and
reparameterizing, we have
FLit = θ1FLi,t−1(1 − FLi,t−1)





This equation is Equation (4) in AM.
5.2.1.2 Alternative speciﬁcations
Relaxing two assumptions used in the benchmark speciﬁcation, three
alternative speciﬁcations are considered:
First, rather than assuming the desired level of ﬁnancial liberalization,
FL∗it , to be full liberalization, it is natural to adopt country-speciﬁc mea-
sures of the desired extent of liberalization. When plugging FL∗ = c
(0 < c < 1) and α = θ1FLi,t−1 into Equation (5.1) above, redeﬁning the
coefﬁcients yields the following equation as in Equation (5) of AM88:
FLit = θ1FLi,t−1 + θ2FL2i,t−1
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Second, the desired level of ﬁnancial liberalization, FL∗it , might be
reasonably regarded to be increasing with the level of income. When
FL∗ = a + bYit and α = θ1FLi,t−1 are considered, Equation (5.1) above
can be rearranged and reparameterized as Equation (6) in AM:89
FLit = θ1FLi,t−1 + θ2FL2i,t−1
+ θ3(FLi,t−1.Yit )





Finally, when the possibility that shocks, ideology and structure vari-
ables may exert effects on the status quo bias is taken into account, the
previous assumption α = θ1FLi,t−1 is replaced by the following equation:
α = γ1FLi,t−1




Putting this expression as well as FL∗ = c into Equation (5.1) and
redeﬁning the coefﬁcients yields the third speciﬁcation, Equation (8) in
AM, below:
FLit = θ1FLi,t−1 + θ2FL2i,t−1
+ θ3(REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1)
+ θ4(REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1).FLi,t−1
+ θ ′5SHOCKSit + θ
′
6SHOCKSit .FLi,t−1
+ θ ′7IDEOLOGYit + θ
′
8IDEOLOGYit .FLi,t−1
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5.2.2 Econometric methods
AM use an ordered logit technique to estimate the benchmark speciﬁ-
cation and three alternative speciﬁcations with the results presented in
Tables 7, 8 and 9 of their paper. A minor problem has been detected in
their empirical results in which Singapore is misclassiﬁed as an African
country while South Africa is misclassiﬁed as an East Asian country. The
corrected results are presented in Appendix Table A5.4. In general, the
pattern of Appendix Table A5.4 (part A) is similar to that of their Table 7.
Appendix Table A5.4 (part B) presents stronger evidence for IMFit and
REG_FLi,t−1−FLi,t−1.90 It is worth noting that Appendix Table A5.4 (part
C) shows that FLi,t−1, OPENit and OPENit× FLi,t−1 appear to be insignif-
icant when country ﬁxed effects are included, different from Table 9 of
AM, which shows these variables to be signiﬁcant when country ﬁxed
effects are included.
More importantly, the analyses conducted by AM may be questioned
in the following two aspects.
The ﬁrst is that the ordered logit technique they apply may not be
natural for this context, although the discrete and ordinal nature of the
ﬁnancial liberalization level, FLi,t , and policy change, FLi,t , may render
the ordered logit method an appropriate choice at ﬁrst glance. Since
the dependent variable is not the level of ﬁnancial liberalization, but policy
change, ﬁnancial liberalization moving from a score of 1 to 3 in terms of
their original measure91 is treated the same as moving from 16 to 18, for
example. However, given the ordinal feature of their original measure,
in reality policy change reﬂected by moving from a score of 1 to 3, which
could be at rather low levels, doesn’t necessarily lead to the same extent of
ﬁnancial liberalization as moving from 16 to 18, which could be at much
higher levels of ﬁnancial liberalization. Given this particular nature of
the dependent variable, resorting to the ordered logit technique may not
lead to the expected gains.
Second, like in most cross-country research, AM do not take into
account the effects of common trends and the possibility of error depen-
dence across countries and over time. This seems especially relevant
when the effects of domestic learning and regional diffusion are inves-
tigated. The assumption on the error term they use implies that the
disturbances are uncorrelated between groups and over time. However,
if the error term contains one or more unobserved factors which have
different effects on every unit, as noted by Phillips and Sul (2003) among
others, “the consequences of ignoring cross section dependence can be
serious”. On the other hand, the consequences of ignoring serial corre-
lation and heteroscedasticity can also be serious, since this may lead to
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a downwards bias in standard errors, and therefore higher signiﬁcance
levels attached to the coefﬁcients. In examining the origins of ﬁnancial
openness, Quinn and Inclán (1997) argue that it is critical to consider
a common trend, such as changes in consumer tastes and technology,
that may exert substantial effects on government liberalization policies
as “fundamental but unobservable forces”.
The particular nature of the dependent variable and the possibility
of error dependence suggest that another estimation approach would
be worthwhile. The wide range of scores on the original ﬁnancial lib-
eralization index from 1 to 18 and the policy change, FLi,t , from -1
to 1 (after transformation) makes a simpler linear regression method a
possible choice for this context. This chapter’s approach centres on the
Pesaran (2006) common correlated effect pooled (CCEP) estimator, a gen-
eralization of the ﬁxed effects estimator which allows for the possibility
of cross-section correlation.92 To adjust for serial correlation in individ-
ual errors,93 the panel-robust standard errors from Arellano (1987) are
computed for the CCEP estimates, allowing the errors not only to be
serially correlated for a given country, but also to have variances and
covariances that vary across countries.
Pesaran (2006) proposes two common correlated effect (CCE)
approaches for large heterogeneous panels whose error contains unob-
served common factors. More speciﬁcally, this approach augments the
one-way ﬁxed effects model with the (weighted) cross-sectional means of
the dependent variable and the individual speciﬁc regressors, analogous
to a two-way ﬁxed effectsmodel. Including the (weighted) cross-sectional
averages of the dependent variable and individual speciﬁc regressors is
suggested by Pesaran (2006, 2007) as an effective way to ﬁlter out the
impacts of common factors, which could be common technological or
macroeconomic shocks, causing between group error dependence.
The Pesaran (2006, 2007) approach exhibits considerable advantages.
It allows unobserved common factors to be possibly correlated with
exogenous regressors and exert differential impacts on individual units.
It permits unit root processes amongst the observed and unobserved
common effects. The proposed estimator is still consistent, although it is
no longer efﬁcient, when the idiosyncratic components are not serially
uncorrelated.
In this context, the cross sectional means of FLit , FLi,t−1, GDPi,t−1
and OPENit are considered since these variables may be especially likely
to reﬂect common effects. To allow the effects to be heterogeneous
across regions, the models are augmented with the interactions between
regional dummies and cross sectional means of the above variables, and
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time dummies. The CCEP estimator has been shown to be asymptoti-
cally unbiased and consistent as N− > ∞ for both T ﬁxed or T − > ∞,
and to have generally satisfactory ﬁnite sample properties.
Appendix Table A5.3 presents the time series properties for three con-
tinuous variables, the ﬁnancial liberalization index (FLi,t ), GDP per
capita in PPP terms (GDPi,t ) and trade openness (OPENi,t ). It contrasts a
panel unit root test proposed by Pesaran (2007) in the presence of cross
section dependence with the Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test, which
is associated with the assumption of cross section independence of the
error term and does not require a balanced panel. The Pesaran (2007)
approach augments the standard ADF regression with cross section aver-
ages of lagged levels and ﬁrst differences of individual series, to control
for cross section dependence. The Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test is
then applied to this more general setting. With cross sectionally inde-
pendent errors, the Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test cannot reject the
null of non-stationarity for FLi,t , GDPi,t and OPENi,t when we do not
allow for a trend. With a trend, the series of GDPi,t and OPENi,t are close
to being found as stationary. When we allow for a trend, Pesaran’s test
shows that we can almost reject the null of non-stationarity for FLi,t ,
GDPi,t and OPENi,t at the 10% signiﬁcance level94, suggesting that FLi,t ,
GDPi,t and OPENi,t may not be I(1) variables. However, this result should
be interpreted with caution since there are reservations as to the power
and reliability of these tests.
This analysis also employs a normal within groups (WG) approach
to estimating the one-way ﬁxed effects models (country ﬁxed effects
included), as estimated by AM, with non-robust standard errors. How
important controlling for error dependence across countries and over
time is for this context can be examined by comparing the WG estimates
and CCEP estimates. The consistency of the one-way WG estimator for
the dynamic homogeneous model is justiﬁed by the length of the time
series,95 but this estimator is biased in small samples because of the
lagged dependent variable bias. The country ﬁxed effects can be elimi-
nated by an idempotent (covariance) transformation matrix as in within
groups estimation.
5.3 Empirical evidence
By applying a within groups approach to the AM framework with the
addition of the extent of democracy, this section presents empirical evi-
dence in two steps on what shapes ﬁnancial reform, an analysis on the
original dataset with the AM measure in Section 5.3.1 and an analysis
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on a larger dataset with the Chinn-Ito (2006) measure in Section 5.3.2.
In each step, the normal one-way ﬁxed effects WG estimates with non-
robust standard errors are contrasted with Pesaran (2006) CCEP estimates
with panel-robust standard errors, with the former assuming that the
errors are serially uncorrelated and independent across countries, while
the latter approach allows for error dependence both across countries
and over time.
5.3.1 Analysis on the original dataset
This section concerns the analyses on the benchmark speciﬁcation
(Equation 5.2) and three alternative speciﬁcations (Equations 5.3, 5.4
and 5.5) using AM’s original dataset. The results are presented in Tables
5.1A/B, 5.2 and 5.3 corresponding to Tables 7, 8 and 9 inAM, respectively.
Table 5.1 (part A) and 5.1 (part B) reports the WG estimates and
CCEP estimates of the benchmark speciﬁcation (Equation 5.2). Table
5.1A strictly follows the model structure of AM96 while Table 5.1 (part
B) reports FLi,t−1 and FL2i,t−1 separately, presenting a direct link between
policy change, FLit , and the level of liberalization, FLi,t−1. In compar-
ison to the ordered logit estimates in columns 4–6 (with country ﬁxed
effects) of Appendix Table A5.4A, the WG estimates in Table 5.1A (coun-
try effects are included by deﬁnition) not only conﬁrm their ﬁndings, but
also show that FIRSTYEARit and OPENit have positive effects on policy
change.
To present a direct link between policy change, FLit , and the level
of liberalization, FLi,t−1, Table 5.1 (part B) reports FLi,t−1 and FL2i,t−1
separately. The within R2 associated with the CCEP estimates is much
larger then those for the WG estimates, hinting at the importance of
error dependence. With satisfactory ﬁnite sample properties, the CCEP
estimates in Table 5.1 show that policy change is negatively rather
than positively associated with the lagged level of ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion, FLi,t−1, and the regional liberalization gap, REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1.
The CCEP estimates conﬁrm the AM ﬁnding on a negative effect of
BANKit , and positive effects of BOPit and FIRSTYEARit on policy change.
It also provides strong evidence for a negative effect of POLITY2it ,
indicating that the extent of democracy tends to hinder the pace of
reform.
Table 5.2 presents the within groups estimates, WG and CCEP, for
the alternative speciﬁcations (Equations 5 and 6 in AM). The CCEP esti-
mates conﬁrm the previous observations of Table 5.1 in terms of the
negative effects of the level of liberalization, regional liberalization gap,
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banking crises and the extent of democracy, and the positive effects of a
balance-of-payments crisis and a new government’s ﬁrst year in ofﬁce. A
positive effect of USINTit is also observed.
Next we proceed to Table 5.3, which presents the within groups esti-
mates of the most general speciﬁcation (Equation 8 in AM). Note that the
corrected Table 9 in AM shows that FLi,t−1, OPENit and OPENit× FLi,t−1
are insigniﬁcant in the presence of country ﬁxed effects. Similarly, the
Table 5.1 Within estimates: Benchmark speciﬁcation (Equation 4)
A. FLi,t−1 × (1 − FLi,t−1) reported
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.083 0.098 0.083 0.046 0.070 0.075
×(1− FLi,t−1) [0.038]** [0.038]*** [0.039]** [0.060] [0.054] [0.056]
REG_FLi,t−1 0.076 0.070 0.083 0.109 0.111 0.121
−FLi,t−1 [0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.027]***
BOPit 0.017 0.013 0.019 0.019
[0.006]*** [0.006]** [0.006]*** [0.006]***
BANKit −0.024 −0.022 −0.021 −0.020
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.010]** [0.009]**
RECESSIONit −0.010 −0.009 −0.006 −0.007
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.003 −0.002 −0.009 −0.012















Observations 805 805 805 805 805 805
Number of
countries
35 35 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.15 0.17
CSD test
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
continued
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Table 5.1 Continued
B. FLi,t−1 and (FLi,t−1)2 reported separately
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.081 0.096 0.074 −0.208 −0.178 −0.202
[0.038]** [0.038]** [0.040]* [0.058]*** [0.061]*** [0.071]***
(FLi,t−1)2 −0.104 −0.113 −0.113 −0.154 −0.175 −0.174
[0.043]** [0.043]*** [0.043]*** [0.066]** [0.065]** [0.064]***
REG_FLi,t−1 0.059 0.058 0.058 −0.144 −0.133 −0.148
−FLi,t−1 [0.022]*** [0.022]*** [0.023]** [0.042]*** [0.047]*** [0.053]***
BOPit 0.016 0.011 0.014 0.014
[0.006]*** [0.006]* [0.006]** [0.005]**
BANKit −0.024 −0.020 −0.019 −0.018
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.010]* [0.009]*
RECESSIONit −0.010 −0.009 −0.002 −0.004
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.003 −0.002 −0.014 −0.012















Observations 805 805 805 805 805 805
Number of
countries
35 35 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.22 0.24
CSD test
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
Notes: 35 countries (original dataset), 1973–96. Dependent variable is FLit . Using normal
one-way within it groups estimator (WG) and Pesaran (2006)’s CCEP estimator, Table 5.1 A/B
presents new results corresponding to models in Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005) with the
addition of POLITY2it . Table 5.1A reports results for FLi,t−1 × (1 − FLi,t−1), while Table 5.1B
reports results for FLi,t−1 and FLi,t−12 separately. The within R-squared is reported. Non-
robust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, while panelrobust standard errors are
reported for CCEP estimates. CSD tests the null hypothesis of cross section independence in
the panel data models using the test following Pesaran (2004).
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 5.2 Within estimates: Alternative speciﬁcation (Equations 5 and 6)
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.074 0.092 −0.202 −0.175
[0.040]* [0.040]** [0.071]*** [0.078]**
(FLi,t−1)2 −0.113 −0.201 −0.174 −0.105
[0.043]*** [0.053]*** [0.064]*** [0.066]
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.007 −0.009
[0.002]*** [0.004]**
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.058 0.063 −0.148 −0.094
[0.023]** [0.023]*** [0.053]*** [0.079]
BOPit 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.016
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.005]** [0.005]***
BANKit −0.020 −0.023 −0.018 −0.016
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.009]* [0.009]*
RECESSIONit −0.009 −0.010 −0.004 −0.004
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.002 −0.004 −0.012 −0.015
[0.011] [0.011] [0.018] [0.018]
FIRSTYEARit 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]*
IMFit 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.009
[0.007]* [0.007]* [0.008] [0.008]
USINTit −0.003 −0.003 0.003 0.006
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.004] [0.003]**
LEFTit 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.011
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
RIGHTit 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.006
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009]
OPENit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000]* [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]
POLITY2it −0.011 −0.010 −0.038 −0.039
[0.014] [0.014] [0.022]* [0.018]**
Observations 805 805 805 805
Number of countries 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.24 0.25
CSD test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Notes: This table, based on the original dataset, presents new results corresponding to models
in Table 8 in AM except for the addition of POLITY2it . See Table 5.1 for further notes.
CCEP estimates of Table 5.3 ﬁnd less evidence for FLi,t−1, OPENit and
OPENit× FLi,t−1. It conﬁrms the negative effect of REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1
on policy reform.97 A positive effect of FIRSTYEARit and a negative effect
of its interaction term with FLi,t−1 are observed, highlighting that new
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REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.025 −0.147
[0.023] [0.055]**
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Table 5.3 Continued
Estimators WG CCEP




POLITY2it × FLi,t−1 0.002 0.001
[0.002] [0.003]
Observations 805 805
Number of countries 35 35
R-squared 0.14 0.27
CSD test (p-value) 0.00 0.01
Notes: This table, based on the original dataset, presents new results corresponding
to models in Table 9 in AM except for the addition of POLITY2it . See Table 5.1 for
further notes.
governments in their ﬁrst year are likely to trigger reform, especially
when the extent of ﬁnancial liberalization is still at an early stage. The
effect of the interaction between LEFTit and FLi,t−1 is also shown to be
positive.
The discrepancy between the WG estimates and CCEP estimates in
the above study has pointed to the fundamental signiﬁcance of relaxing
assumptions on the error term. One may wonder which is more impor-
tant, controlling for serial correlation in the errors or adjusting for cross
section error dependence? To what extent does each relaxation make the
results different from those associated with error independence? Answers
may be found from Table 5.4, which reports the WG estimates with
panel-robust standard errors, controlling for serial correlation of errors
only, and the CCEP estimates with non-robust standard errors, con-
trolling for cross section error dependence only. As it stands, both are
important. Nevertheless, the quantitatively larger effects (coefﬁcients)
and much larger R2 associated with the CCEP estimates than with the
WG estimates may reﬂect that controlling for cross-country correlation
is an especially crucial step for this context. One may notice from Table
5.4 that, suggested by either the WG estimates or CCEP estimates, the
ideology and economic and political structure in general appear to have a
substantial inﬂuence on policy change, especially for LEFTit and OPENit .
This has raised a methodological concern that insufﬁcient consideration
of error dependence could lead to misleading ﬁndings.
140 Determinants of Financial Development
Table 5.4 Error dependence across countries and over time considered
separately
A. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.1B
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.081 0.096 0.074 −0.208 −0.178 −0.202
[0.049] [0.045]** [0.053] [0.056]*** [0.057]*** [0.059]***
(FLi,t−1) −0.104 −0.113 −0.113 −0.154 −0.175 −0.174
[0.046]** [0.045]** [0.051]** [0.049]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]***
REG_FLi,t−1 0.059 0.058 0.058 −0.144 −0.133 −0.148
−FLi,t−1 [0.025]** [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.037]*** [0.037]*** [0.040]***
BOPit 0.016 0.011 0.014 0.014
[0.006]** [0.006]* [0.006]** [0.006]**
BANKit −0.024 −0.020 −0.019 −0.018
[0.009]** [0.009]** [0.007]*** [0.007]**
RECESSIONit −0.010 −0.009 −0.002 −0.004
[0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.003 −0.002 −0.014 −0.012















Observations 805 805 805 805 805 805
Number of
countries
35 35 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.22 0.24
CSD test
(p-value)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
Notes: Panelrobust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, whilst non-robust standard
errors are reported for CCEP estimates. See Table 5.1 for further notes.
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Table 5.4 Continued
B. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.2
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 0.074 0.092 −0.202 −0.175
[0.053] [0.053]* [0.059]*** [0.062]***
(FLi,t−1)2 −0.113 −0.201 −0.174 −0.105
[0.051]** [0.068]*** [0.050]*** [0.055]*
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.007 −0.009
[0.003]** [0.003]***
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.058 0.063 −0.148 −0.094
[0.027]** [0.025]** [0.040]*** [0.047]**
BOPit 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.016
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]** [0.006]**
BANKit −0.020 −0.023 −0.018 −0.016
[0.009]** [0.009]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
RECESSIONit −0.009 −0.010 −0.004 −0.004
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
HINFLit −0.002 −0.004 −0.012 −0.015
[0.020] [0.020] [0.011] [0.011]
FIRSTYEARit 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
[0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]* [0.006]*
IMFit 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
USINTit −0.003 −0.003 0.003 0.006
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003] [0.003]*
LEFTit 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.011
[0.008] [0.007] [0.011] [0.011]
RIGHTit 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.006
[0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010]
OPENit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000]* [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]
POLITY2it −0.011 −0.010 −0.038 −0.039
[0.013] [0.013] [0.015]*** [0.015]***
Observations 805 805 805 805
Number of countries 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.24 0.25
CSD test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Note: Panelrobust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, whilst non-robust standard
errors are reported for CCEP estimates. See Table 5.1 for further notes.
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Table 5.4 Continued






REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.025 −0.147
[0.029] [0.040]***


































RIGHTit × FLi,t−1 0.020 0.025
[0.034] [0.032]
continued









POLITY2it × FLi,t−1 0.002 0.001
[0.002] [0.002]
Observations 805 805
Number of countries 35 35
R-squared 0.14 0.27
CSD test (p-value) 0.00 0.01
Notes: Panelrobust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, whilst
non-robust standard errors are reported for CCEP estimates. See Table 5.1
for further notes.
In sum, the above analyses based on the augmented speciﬁcations
in which POLITY2it is included, allowing for the possibility of error
dependence across countries and over time, produce interesting ﬁnd-
ings. On the one hand, this chapter conﬁrms the signiﬁcant effects of
crises and shocks on policy reform identiﬁed by AM. More speciﬁcally, it
conﬁrms negative effects of banking crises and high inﬂation, and does
agree with AM that a new government in its ﬁrst year and an IMF pro-
gramme have a strong effect when ﬁnancial sectors are highly repressed
and a weaker effect thereafter. On the other hand, it differs from AM in
the following three aspects. First, it shows that the signiﬁcant effects
of balance-of-payments crises and US interest rates found by AM are
fragile. The second aspect is that it yields opposite ﬁndings to AM on the
effects of domestic learning. It shows that the extent of policy reform
is negatively rather than positively affected by the existing liberaliza-
tion level, while the regional liberalization gap does not appear relevant.
Third, it addresses the importance of the extent of democracy for the
process of ﬁnancial reform and identiﬁes a negative effect of the extent
of democracy on policy change.
5.3.2 Analysis on a larger dataset
This section makes an effort to explore if the ﬁndings are robust to a
larger set of countries. It makes use of the Chinn-Ito index of ﬁnancial
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openness (2006) which is available for 108 countries over 1970–2000. But
the Chinn-Ito index measures only a country’s degree of capital account
openness, one aspect of six policy dimensions on which the creation of
the AM is based. Moreover, the country coverage in this analysis is con-
ﬁned to the data availability of crisis variables taken from Bordo et al.
(2000) which contains only 55 countries. Since most of the added coun-
tries areOECD countries (listed in the Appendix Table A5.2), the effects of
factors like balance-of-payment crises, banking crises, IMF programmes
and the extent of democracy are expected to be weaker.98 A variable
description is presented in Appendix Table A5.1.
Tables 5.5A, 5.5B and 5.5C report the within groups estimates corre-
sponding to Tables 5.1B, 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. As expected, these
tables show weaker evidence for the effects of shocks, crises, ideology
and economic and political structures on policy reform, except for US
interest rates and high inﬂation. But, since the above analysis in general
obtains ﬁndings consistent with AM on the effects of crises and shocks,
more emphasis is placed on the robustness of the new ﬁndings regarding
the negative effects of domestic learning and regional diffusion.
With a larger sample size, both the WG and CCEP estimates in these
tables clearly indicate that policy reform is negatively linked to the level
of liberalization, FLi,t−1, at the 1% signiﬁcance level. The tables fur-
ther conﬁrm that the effect of REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 on policy change is
ambiguous. Removing the variable IMFi,t doesn’t alter the pattern of the
results, as reported in Appendix Table A5.5 (A, B, C).
Hence, the ﬁndings summarized earlier on the negative effects of
domestic learning and irrelevance of regional diffusion are largely sup-
ported by a larger sample of countries based on the Chinn-Ito index of
capital account openness.
5.4 Discussions
The above ﬁndings have several implications. The negative link between
policy change and the liberalization level suggests a convergence in the
extent of ﬁnancial liberalization in the sense that countries with highly
repressed ﬁnancial sectors have more potential to embark on reform,
while countries with a highly liberalized ﬁnancial sector have greater
status quo bias – the reform likelihood is “saturated” (AM). Vivid exam-
ples can easily be picked up from the ﬁnancial liberalization process in
East Asia in recent decades. Since the 1970s, countries or areas with levels
of liberalization much lower than those of the main developed countries
(the US or UK for example) like the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Hong
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Table 5.5 Augmented dataset with Chinn-Ito measure (2006)
A. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.1B
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 −0.168 −0.170 −0.185 −0.204 −0.214 −0.301
[0.044]*** [0.044]*** [0.048]*** [0.069]*** [0.068]*** [0.086]***
(FLi,t−1)2 0.052 0.053 0.070 0.087 0.092 0.164
[0.037] [0.037] [0.039]* [0.049]* [0.049]* [0.058]***
REG_FLi,t−1 −0.016 −0.018 0.007 0.048 0.044 0.063
−FLi,t−1 [0.027] [0.027] [0.030] [0.036] [0.037] [0.046]
BOPit 0.002 0.003 −0.005 −0.006
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
BANKit −0.010 −0.012 −0.008 −0.010
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011]
RECESSIONit −0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
HINFLit −0.018 −0.015 −0.009 −0.007















Observations 1263 1262 1150 1263 1262 1150
Number of
countries
55 55 53 55 55 53
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.26
Notes: 55 countries, 1973–97. Dependent variable is FLi,t . Using normal one-way within
groups estimator (WG) and Pesaran (2006)’s CCEP estimator, this table, based on a larger
dataset associated with the Chinn-Ito measure (2006), presents new results corresponding to
Table 5.1B. The within groups R-squared is reported. Variable descriptions are presented in the
Appendix Table A5.1. Countries included are listed in the Appendix Table A5.2. Non-robust
standard errors are reported for WG estimates, while panelrobust standard errors are reported
for CCEP estimates.
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table 5.5 Continued
B. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.2
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 −0.185 −0.180 −0.301 −0.375
[0.048]*** [0.048]*** [0.086]*** [0.122]***
(FLi,t−1)2 0.070 0.028 0.164 0.138
[0.039]* [0.046] [0.058]*** [0.071]*
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.003 0.002
[0.002]* [0.004]
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.007 0.013 0.063 0.038
[0.030] [0.030] [0.046] [0.058]
BOPit 0.003 0.002 −0.006 −0.012
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010]
BANKit −0.012 −0.011 −0.010 −0.002
[0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013]
RECESSIONit 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002
[0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010]
HINFLit −0.015 −0.018 −0.007 0.006
[0.013] [0.013] [0.018] [0.017]
FIRSTYEARit 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
[0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006]
IMFit 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.010
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
USINTit −0.005 −0.005 −0.002 −0.002
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002] [0.002]
LEFTit −0.002 −0.004 −0.010 −0.013
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
RIGHTit 0.000 −0.002 −0.003 −0.008
[0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.017]
OPENit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
POLITY2it −0.003 −0.003 0.004 0.007
[0.018] [0.018] [0.027] [0.033]
Observations 1150 1150 1150 1150
Number of countries 53 53 53 53
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.26 0.33
Note: See Table 5.5A for further notes.
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Table 5.5 Continued






REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 −0.006 −0.009
[0.031] [0.057]


































RIGHTit × FLi,t−1 −0.011 0.022
[0.031] [0.048]
continued









POLITY2it × FLi,t−1 0.001 0.000
[0.002] [0.007]
Observations 1150 1150
Number of countries 53 53
R-squared 0.10 0.35
Note: See Table 5.5A for further notes.
Kong, Thailand and China have actively and progressively liberalized
their ﬁnancial systems.
This research ﬁnds that the signiﬁcant effect of a regional liberalization
gap on policy changes is hard to identify, although two opposite views
have been proposed in the literature. AM suggest that countries with a
level of liberalization far from that of the regional leader are found to be
more likely to undertake reform, perhaps due to competitive pressure.
The larger the gap in terms of liberalization levels within a region, the
ﬁercer the competition amongst these countries for international capital
and technologies. In contrast, Axelrod (1997) documents that the more
similar a country is to its neighbouring nations in terms of economic,
social and political developments, the more likely it is that it “adopts
one of the neighbour’s traits” while Simmons and Elkins (2004) predict
that “governments’ liberalization policies will be inﬂuenced by the poli-
cies of their most important foreign economic competitors”. This line of
research in general predicts that a greater gap from the regional leader
tends to be associated with less incentive to compete and less chance to
catch up with the regional leader in the short run, therefore a status quo
bias is maintained.
In accordance with AM, the pattern suggested by their Table 3 that the
coefﬁcient on REG_FLi,t−1 −FLi,t−1 is positive and the coefﬁcient on the
interaction term is negative although insigniﬁcant, seems to be in line
with the convergence story identiﬁed earlier in the sense that countries
with lower levels of liberalization relative to that of the regional leader
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are more inclined to initiate reform, while the reform momentum fades
as the liberalization gap from the regional leader shrinks. It implies that
a greater gap from the regional leader tends to be associated with more
incentives to engage in reform.
The ﬁnding concerning the negative effect of the extent of democracy
on policy change is consistent with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), who
argue that there is uncertainty with respect to the distribution of bene-
ﬁts and costs from reform. They contrast democratic societies in which
the majority would vote against the reform due to the presence of this
uncertainty, just for safety, with authoritarian societies like Taiwan and
the Republic of Korea (early 1960s), Chile (1970s) and Turkey (1980s),
where “reform was imposed by the authoritarian regimes and against the
wishes of business.” The status quo appears to be more easily dislodged
in autocratic societies than in democratic societies.
Chapter 4 shows that democratization is typically followed by ﬁnan-
cial development at least in the short run, which is in line with the
argument of Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) in terms of a short-run boost
in economic growth and a decline in growth volatility after democrati-
zation. Together with the ﬁndings of Chapter 4, a clear picture seems
to appear to us: a short-run increase in ﬁnancial development emerges
after democratization; however, once democracy has been established
and enhanced, the extent of democracy may exert negative effects on
the extent to which governments undertake ﬁnancial reform.
This ﬁnding tends to suggest that ideology and political structure can
have a substantial inﬂuence on policy change, contrary to some extent to
the ﬁndings of AM, who claim that ideology and economic and political
structure have a limited inﬂuence on policy change.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the forces that lead governments to undertake
reforms to enhance ﬁnancial development, based on AM. Given the par-
ticular nature of the dependent variable, it suggests replacing the ordered
logit technique used by AM with a within groups approach, allowing for
the possibility of error dependence across countries and over time, which
seems of especial importance when the effects of domestic learning and
regional diffusion in the process of ﬁnancial liberalization are studied.
Based on these innovations, the analysis shows that some of the AM
ﬁndings are not robust to error dependence and the estimation method.
It has produced the following signiﬁcant ﬁndings, shedding new light
on the political economy of ﬁnancial reform.
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This chapter ﬁnds that policy change in a country is negatively rather
than positively associated with the initial extent of liberalization level,
and the distance behind the regional leader. This indicates convergence
in the extent of ﬁnancial liberalization, in the sense that countries with
highly repressed ﬁnancial sectors have more potential to embark on
reform, whilst countries with a highly liberalized ﬁnancial sector have
greater status quo bias.
This analysis suggests that some of AM ﬁndings on the effects of shocks
and crises are robust whilst others are fragile. More speciﬁcally, it con-
ﬁrms the negative effects of banking crises and high inﬂation. It also
agrees with AM that new governments in their ﬁrst year and IMF pro-
grammes have a strong effect when ﬁnancial sectors are highly repressed,
and a weaker effect thereafter. But it ﬁnds no evidence in support of
the effects of balance-of-payments crises and US interest rates on policy
change.
Furthermore, it shows that economic and political structure and ide-
ology can have a substantial inﬂuence on policy change, and the extent
of democracy, the added variable, has a signiﬁcantly negative effect on
policy reform.
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Appendix tables
Table A5.1 The variables (mainly used with the larger dataset)
Variable Description Source
FL It is the ﬁnancial liberalization index,
produced by rescaling the Chinn-Ito
index to interval [0, 1]. The Chinn-Ito
index, the KAOPEN index, measures a
country’s degree of capital account
openness, taking on higher values the




Y GDP per capita in PPP terms. Penn World
Table 6.2
BOP As in Abiad and Mody (2005) (originally
taken from Bordo et al. (2000)), it is the
balance-of-payments crisis variable
identiﬁed by “a forced change in parity,
abandonment of a pegged exchange rate,
or an international rescue,” or if an index
of exchange market pressure (a weighted
average of exchange rate, reserve and
interest rate changes) exceeds a critical
threshold of one and a half standard
deviations above its mean. It is set equal
to 1 if a balance of payments crisis has
occurred within the past two years, and 0
otherwise.
Bordo et al. (2000)
BANK As in Abiad and Mody (2005) (originally
taken from Bordo et al. (2000)), it is the
bankig crisis identiﬁed by periods of
“ﬁnancial distress resulting in the erosion
of most or all of aggregate banking
system capital”. It is set equal to 1 if a
banking crisis has occurred within the
past two years, and 0 otherwise.
Bordo et al. (2000)
RECESSION As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the
recession dummy variable, set equal to 1
where the annual real GDP growth rate is
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Table A5.1 Continued
Variable Description Source
HINFL As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the
high inﬂation dummy variable, set equal
to 1 where the annual inﬂation exceeds





FIRSTYEAR Based on the YRSOFFC variable (how
many years the chief executive has been
in ofﬁce), it is the ﬁrst year in ofﬁce





IMF As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the
IMF programme dummy variable
constructed using the programme dates






USINT As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the US





LEFT As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it denotes a
left-wing government where its







RIGHT As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it denotes
the right-wing government where its






OPEN The sum of exports and imports over




DEMO Index of democracy. It is called combined
the polity score, and is the democracy
score minus the autocracy score, averaged
over 1973–97. It is also used with the
original dataset. The index has been
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Table A5.2 The list of countries in the augmented dataset
East Asia South Asia OECD countries
CHN China BGD Bangladesh* AUS Australia*
HKG Hong Kong IND India* AUT Austria
IDN Indonesia* LKA Sri Lanka* BEL Belgium
KOR Korea, Rep.* NPL Nepal* CAN Canada*
MYS Malaysia* PAK Pakistan* CHE Switzerland
PHL Philippines* DEU Germany*
SGP Singapore* DNK Denmark
THA Thailand* ESP Spain
TWN Taiwan* FIN Finland
FRA France*
Latin America Middle East GBR United Kingdom*
& Caribbean & Africa GRC Greece
ARG Argentina* EGY Egypt* IRL Ireland
BRA Brazil* GHA Ghana* ISL Iceland
CHL Chile* ISR Israel* ITA Italy*
COL Colombia* MAR Morocco* JPN Japan*
CRI Costa Rica NGA Nigeria NLD Netherlands
ECU Ecuador ZAF South Africa* NOR Norway
JAM Jamaica ZWE Zimbabwe* NZL New Zealand*
MEX Mexico* PRT Portugal
PER Peru* SWE Sweden
PRY Paraguay TUR Turkey*
URY Uruguay USA USA*
VEN Venezuela*
Note: Countries with ∗ are in the original dataset of Abiad and Mody (2005).
Table A5.3 Unit root test in heterogeneous panels
Variables FL GDP OPEN
Trend Yes No Yes No Yes No
Maddala and 43.82 25.39 77.84 52.81 75.23 64.11




74.85 50.23 67.65 54.98 63.01 62.31
Notes: Maddala and Wu (1999)’s Fisher test is for the case of cross sectionally independent
error. Under the null of a unit root, the test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a standard
normal. Pesaran (2007)’s test is the Maddala and Wu (1999)’s Fisher test applied to the cross
sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller regression. The 10% critical values provided by H.M.
Pesaran for the pair of N = 30 and T = 30 is 82.89 with a trend and 82.18 without a trend.
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Table A5.4 Corrected version of Tables 7, 8 and 9 in Abiad and Mody (2005)
A. Corrected version of Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005)
Country
dummy
included No No No Yes Yes Yes
FLi,t−1 3.933 4.562 4.106 6.794 7.284 6.574
×(1 −
FLi,t−1)
[4.39]*** [4.94]*** [4.48]*** [4.44]*** [4.83]*** [4.07]***
REG_FLi,t−1 1.032 1.050 1.195 2.285 2.089 2.529
−FLi,t−1 [4.18]*** [3.76]*** [3.93]*** [3.23]*** [2.71]*** [3.21]***
BOPit 0.521 0.430 0.550 0.475
[2.60]*** [2.21]** [2.19]** [1.94]*
BANKit −1.020 −0.983 −0.995 −0.935
[2.74]*** [2.67]*** [2.68]*** [2.57]**
RECESSIONit −0.018 0.002 −0.055 −0.026
[0.05] [0.00] [0.15] [0.07]
HINFLit −0.136 −0.238 −0.317 −0.302













Observations 805 805 805 805 805 805
Number of
countries
35 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: This is a corrected version of Table 7 in Abiad andMody (2005), which treated Singapore
as an African country and South Africa as an East Asian country. Except for the difference in
magnitude, this table shows a similar pattern to Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005). Robust
t-statistics in brackets.
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Table A5.4 Continued
B. Corrected version of Table 8 in Abiad and Mody (2005)
Country dummy
included No No Yes Yes
FLi,t−1 4.110 4.307 6.546 7.189
[4.49]*** [4.69]*** [4.02]*** [4.34]***
(FLi,t−1)2 −4.052 −5.720 −6.638 −9.893
[3.94]*** [4.19]*** [3.35]*** [3.90]***
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.095 0.247
[2.34]** [2.55]**
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 1.231 0.965 2.465 2.714
[2.72]*** [1.88]* [2.09]** [2.45]**
BOPit 0.429 0.476 0.473 0.457
[2.19]** [2.40]** [2.02]** [1.95]*
BANKit −0.985 −0.976 −0.932 −1.007
[2.70]*** [2.70]*** [2.70]*** [2.92]***
RECESSIONit −0.002 −0.005 −0.027 0.001
[0.00] [0.01] [0.07] [0.00]
HINFLit −0.235 −0.206 −0.303 −0.398
[0.63] [0.53] [0.48] [0.64]
FIRSTYEARit 0.178 0.141 0.233 0.245
[0.78] [0.62] [0.86] [0.91]
IMFit 0.332 0.414 0.255 0.288
[1.74]* [2.12]** [0.96] [1.06]
USINTit −0.070 −0.074 −0.090 −0.086
[1.80]* [1.87]* [2.07]** [1.99]**
LEFTit 0.280 0.190 −0.029 −0.098
[1.15] [0.82] [0.08] [0.28]
RIGHTit 0.146 0.153 −0.125 −0.072
[0.77] [0.84] [0.38] [0.21]
OPENit −0.001 0.000 0.009 0.013
[1.00] [0.04] [1.14] [1.40]
Observations 805 805 805 805
Number of countries 35 35 35 35
Notes: This table corresponds to the Table 8 in Abiad and Mody (2005), which treated Sin-
gapore as an African country and South Africa as an East Asian country, and consequently
indicates that IMF in column 1 and REG_FL-FL in columns 2 and 3 are insigniﬁcant. Robust
t-statistics in brackets.
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
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C. Corrected version of Table 9 in Abiad and Mody (2005)





REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.508 1.459
[0.81] [1.21]


































RIGHT × FLi,t−1 0.087 −0.221
[0.09] [0.19]
continued
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Table A5.4 Continued
Country dummy included No Yes
OPENit 3.719 3.475
[2.16]** [1.61]
OPENit × FLi,t−1 −3.827 −1.82
[2.19]** [0.70]
Observations 805 805
Number of countries 35 35
Notes: This table corresponds to the Table 9 in Abiad and Mody (2005),
which treated Singapore as an African country and South Africa as an
East Asian country, and consequently indicates that (REG_FL−FL)×FL
is signiﬁcant but OPEN and OPEN × FL are insigniﬁcant in column 1,
and FL, OPEN and OPEN × FL are signiﬁcant in column 2. Robust
t-statistics in brackets.
∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table A5.5 Augmented dataset with Chinn-Ito measure (2006): IMF dropped
A. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.1B
Estimators WG WG WG CCEP CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 −0.168 −0.170 −0.174 −0.204 −0.214 −0.261
[0.044]*** [0.044]*** [0.045]*** [0.069]*** [0.068]*** [0.084]***
(FLi,t−1)2 0.052 0.053 0.056 0.087 0.092 0.119
[0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.049]* [0.049]* [0.059]**
REG_FLi,t−1 −0.016 −0.018 0.002 0.048 0.044 0.044
−FLi,t−1 [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.036] [0.037] [0.036]
BOPit 0.002 0.001 −0.005 −0.006
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
BANKit −0.010 −0.010 −0.008 −0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011]
RECESSIONit −0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
HINFLit −0.018 −0.017 −0.009 −0.009
[0.012] [0.013] [0.017] [0.017]
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Observations 1263 1262 1213 1263 1262 1213
Number of
countries
55 55 53 55 55 53
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.25
Note: See Table 5.5A for notes.
B. Within estimates corresponding to Table 5.2
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
FLi,t−1 −0.174 −0.169 −0.261 −0.343
[0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.084]*** [0.118]***
(FLi,t−1)2 0.056 0.006 0.119 0.079
[0.038] [0.044] [0.059]** [0.081]
FLi,t−1 × Yi,t−1 0.004 0.004
[0.002]** [0.004]
REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 0.002 0.007 0.044 0.012
[0.028] [0.028] [0.036] [0.048]
BOPit 0.001 0.001 −0.006 −0.011
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
BANKit −0.010 −0.010 −0.009 0.000
[0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013]
RECESSIONit 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
[0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009]
HINFLit −0.017 −0.020 −0.009 0.000
[0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.016]
FIRSTYEARit 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
USINTit −0.005 −0.004 −0.002 −0.001
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002] [0.002]
LEFTit −0.004 −0.006 −0.008 −0.012
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
RIGHTit 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.004
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.015]
OPENit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000]* [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000]
continued
Financial Reforms for Financial Development 159
Table A5.5 Continued
Estimators WG WG CCEP CCEP
POLITY2it −0.002 −0.002 0.012 0.019
[0.016] [0.016] [0.022] [0.028]
Observations 1213 1213 1213 1213
Number of countries 53 53 53 53
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.25 0.31
Note: See Table 5.5A for notes.
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REG_FLi,t−1 − FLi,t−1 −0.024 −0.040
[0.029] [0.053]




















FIRSTYEARit × FLi,t−1 0.010 0.010
[0.020] [0.018]
continued





LEFTit × FLi,t−1 −0.017 −0.034
[0.015] [0.025]












POLITY2it × FLi,t−1 0.002 0.002
[0.002] [0.005]
Observations 1213 1213
Number of countries 53 53
R-squared 0.09 0.33
Note: See Table 5.5A for notes.
